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OHIO'S POINT SYSTEM AND TRAFFIC COURTS
JAMES P. ECONOMOS*
Comprehensive legislation on the subject of "Point Systems" af-
fecting operator's and chauffeur's licenses was enacted by the last session
of Ohio's General Assembly.' Ohio is the third state to take the legis-
lative route in setting up a system of points to be assessed against indi-
vidual motor vehicle operators for convictions of violations of traffic
laws. The states which preceded Ohio were Nebraska in 19532 and
South Carolina in 1955.3
Point systems had previously been established by administrative
rule or regulation in other states, the first one being established in
1947 by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for the state of Connecti-
cut.4 The satisfactory experience reported by this state led to a similar
program being undertaken on July 1, 1952 by the Director of Motor
Vehicles of New Jersey; by the South Carolina State Highway Department
on January 1, 1953; and by the Director of Vehicles and Traffic for
the District of Columbia on April 1, 1953.6 At the present time twelve
other states are using a point system as an administrative guide to driver's
license suspensions and revocations.' Several other states, without public
announcement, follow the format of a point system in ascertaining
when to take action against drivers accumulating a number of con-
victions, bail forfeitures and accidents.
8
*Director, Traffic Court Program, American Bar Association, Chicago,
Illinois.
IAmended House Bill No. 148 was passed on June 18, 1957 and approved
by the Governor on June 22, 1957. It carried an emergency clause making it
effective immediately as of June 22, 1957. However, the Common Pleas Court of
Hamilton County ruled this act was not effective until September.
2 NEB. REv. STAT. §§39-794 through 37-796, 39-7,128 through 39-7,133 (Supp.
1955).
3 S. C. CODE §§46-193 through 46-193.15 (Supp. 1956).
4An effort to establish a legislative point system for Connecticut was vetoed
on June 21, 1957. Public Acts of Connecticut, January session 1957, Act No. 600,
page 943. It was reported that the governor's veto was based on the inclusion of
a provision permitting an application for a hearing within five days of the
suspension under the point system and after such hearing to restore such license
or continue the suspension.
5The administrative regulations were subsequently declared invalid. South
Carolina State Highway Department v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E. 2d 466 (1955).
6 ELKOW and STACK, THE POINT SYSTEM, Center for Safety Education, New
York University, 1954, pages S and 9.
7 These states are Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin.
California's negligent operator program is considered to qualify as a point system.
8 Alabama, Arizona, Iowa, Michigan and Oklahoma use such a plan even
though not generally publicized as much as the other states listed in footnote 7,
sulpra.
TRAFFIC POINT SYSTEM
The Ohio Point System Law provides for recording points for
each conviction or bond forfeiture on the following formula:
(A) Manslaughter resulting from the operation of a
motor vehicle 6 points
(B) Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor or narcotic drug -- 6 points
(C) Failing to stop and disclose identity at the scene of
the accident when required by law 6 points
(D) Driving while operator's or chauffeur's license is
under suspension or revocation ...... ...- 6 points
(E) Reckless operation in violation of section 4511.20
of the Revised Code or ordinance in conformity
thereto, if based upon any factor other than speed -- 3 points
(F) Violation of any law or ordinance pertaining to
speed ------------------------------------ 2 points
(G) All other moving violations pertaining to the oper-
ation of motor vehicles reported under this section _ 2 points
An abstract of court records must be forwarded to the Registrar
of Motor Vehicles within 10 days of the conviction or bond forfeiture
of a person charged with violating the Rules of the Road provisions set
out in sections 4511.01 to 4511.78 and 4511.99, Revised Code; the
equipment and load provisions contained in sections 4513.01-4513.36,
Revised Code, or any other law or ordinance regulating the operation
of vehicles, streetcars, and trackless trolleys on highways.
It is further provided that:
Whenever the points charged against any person exceeds five,
the registrar shall forward to such person at his last known
address, a warning letter listing the reported violations, along
with the number of points charged for each, and outlining the
suspension provision of this section.
When, upon determination of the registrar, any person
has charged against him a total of not less than twelve points
within a period of two years from the date of the first con-
viction within said two year period, the registrar shall, within
thirty days from the date of the last such conviction, file an
application with the clerk of the court of common pleas in
the county where such person resides or, if the offender is a
child as defined in section 2151.01 of the Revised Code, in
the juvenile court in the county wherein such person resides,
requesting suspension of such person's license or permit to
operate a motor vehicle for a period of one year.
Section 4507.40, Revised Code, further declares that the existence
of a record which shows twelve or more points charged against a person
shall be prima facie evidence that such person is an habitual traffic law
violator under the provisions of this section.
This section further provides that the hearing in the Court of
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Common Pleas shall be on the issue: "Is the person whose license is
sought to be suspended an habitual traffic law violator?" The court
shall decide such issue upon the record certified by the registrar and
such additional relevant, competent and material evidence as either the
registrar or the person whose license is sought to be suspended submits.
If the court finds from the evidence submitted that the person
whose license is sought to be suspended is an habitual traffic law violator
under the provisions of this section then the court may:
(1) Impose the suspension requested by the registrar;
(2) Withhold the suspension as requested by the registrar,
or a part thereof, and provide such conditions or probation
as the court deems proper.
The enactment of Section 4507.40, Revised Code, raises several
questions of interest to traffic court judges and others. In the first in-
stance, the General Assembly added the point system to the existing
methods for suspending or revoking the license of an operator or
chauffeur. It retained Section 4507.16, Revised Code, which permits
the trial judge of any court of record to suspend, for any period of
time not exceeding three years or to revoke, the license of any person
who is convicted of or pleads guilty to:
(A) Manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor
vehicle;
(B) Operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or narcotic drug;
(C) Perjury or the making of a false affidavit under sections
4507.01 to 4507.39, inclusive, of the Revised Code, or
any other law of this state requiring the registration of
motor vehicles or regulating their operation on the
highway.
(D) Any crime punishable as a felony under the motor
vehicle laws of this state or any other felon), in the
commission of which a motor vehicle is used;
(E) Failing to stop and disclose identity at the scene of the
accident when required by law to do so.
The General Assembly also continued the authority of any trial
judge of a court of record, to suspend the license of any person coming
within the provisions of Section 4507.34, Revised Code, which reads:
Whenever a person is found guilty under the laws of this state
or any ordinance of any political subdivision thereof, of oper-
ating a motor vehicle in violation of such laws or ordinances,
relating to reckless operation, the trial court of any court of
record may, in addition to or independent of all other penalties
provided by law, suspend for an), period of time or revoke the
license to drive of any person so convicted or pleading guilty
to such offenses for such period as it determines, not to exceed
one year.
The requirement upon judges of courts of record to note con-
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victions or pleas of guilty for any violation of the traffic laws upon the
operator's or chauffeur's license has been eliminated.9 However, the duty
to report such conviction and pleas of guilty has been incorporated in
Section 4507.40, Revised Code, the section under discussion. This con-
tinuing duty to report convictions is the heart of the operation of the
point system.
It is fair to assume that as the public becomes acquainted with the
Ohio Point System that more and more persons will be demanding trials
in the traffic courts. Each encounter with a charge for violating traffic
laws will assume greater importance to the violator. His habit of for-
feiting bail without appearance in court will undoubtedly change if the
Registrar of Motor Vehicles takes full advantage of the Point System.
With court appearances increasing, so will the prospect of retaining legal
counsel increase, not only to defend against the pending charge but also
against any action that may be initiated under the point system law. 10
The first question that arises in reviewing the point system provisions
relates to the validity of this type of legislation. The Ohio Court of
Appeals in Franklin County had occasion to consider the constitutionality
of the Financial Responsibility Law. In Ragland v. TVallace," the court
qtated :
This class of legislation falls within the police power of the
state under which the Legislature is given an exceedingly broad
power. It lies within the power of the Legislature to enact
legislation controlling the operation of a motor vehicle on the
public highways, prescribing who may operate such motor
vehicles, and under what conditions such right is denied. The
Legislature is not restricted in the exercise of this power unless
the enactment violates some specific constitutional provision or
provisions of the enactment are found to be an unreasonable
exercise of the power.
Plaintiff-appellant was given a remedy under the Act, and
he pursued it. He had his day in court. We are of the opinion
that Section 6928-1, G.C., and other related sections of the
Act, particularly Section 6928-18 G.C. which provides for a
review of the order of the Registrar in the Common Pleas
Court are in pari materia and must be construed together.
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the provisions of these
sections meet the test of due process and not in violation of the
"due process" clause, Amendment XIV Section 1 in the
United States Constitution, or the "due course of law" clause,
Article 1, Section 16 in the State Constitution.
OThe first paragraph of Onio REV. CoDE §4507.15 was repealed by Section 2
of Amended House Bill No. 148.
10 Youngstown Vindicator, July 22, 1957.
1 80 Ohio App. 210, 70 N.E. 2d 118 (1946).
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On the basis of this view, it would appear that the Ohio courts
would be inclined to uphold the point system.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska has had two occasions to consider
appeals arising under its legislative point system. In the first case, Durfee
v. Ress,'2 decided February 15, 1957, the validity of the order revoking
the driver's license under the point system was not challenged. However,
it was contended that the refusal of the Director of the Motor Vehicle
Division to suspend the revocation upon providing "three years proof of
financial responsibility" was invalid.
The court stated that:
revocation of the driver's license here involved is in no sense
a penalty for the violation of statutes or ordinances involved.
The penalties provided therefor have been satisfied.
The net of this situation is that the plaintiff by his viola-
tions of the law has created a record upon which the state in
the exercise of its police power has determined that his driver's
license shall be revoked. The state has also determined the
conditions under which that revocation may be suspended.
• . . We conclude that the revocation of a license to operate a
motor vehicle in this state under the point system provided by
the statute is not an added punishment for the offense or
offenses committed as a result of which the points are accumu-
lated. The purpose of the revocation is to protect the public,
and not to punish the licensee. Where an operator's license is
revoked under the point system and the statute providing the
conditions under which the revocation may be suspended has
been amended during the period of the accumulation of the
points as a result of which the revocation occurs, the amended
act controls. Such an application is not an ex post facto appli-
cation within the prohibitions of the United States and the
state Constitutions.
The second Nebraska case of Stewart v. Ress'3 was decided on
June 28, 1957. Again, the constitutionality of the point system was not
challenged. The order of the Director of Motor Vehicles was attacked
as being void on the ground that the files and records did not contain
sufficient proof of the required number of twelve points because: (a) one
conviction report named a person with a different middle initial; 14 (b)
another conviction report listed the driver's license as J2-1901-L while
the correct driver's license number was J2-190-16; and (c) the other
conviction reports did not specify whether a municipal ordinance or a
statutory prohibition was violated. The court, after disposing of these
12 163 Neb. 786, 81 N.V. 2d 148 (1957).
13 164 Neb. 876, 83 NAV. 2d 901 (1957).
14 The person named in one conviction report used in assessing points was
shown as Donald H. Stewart. The person whose license was revoked was named
Donald A. Stewart.
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contentions on the ground that they had been inferentially conceded by
the pleadings, stated:
The plea of guilty to each of the charges made by appellee was
the equivalent of a conviction by trial and verdict or a finding
of guilty by the court.
Accused, by making a plea of guilty, waives all defenses,
except that the complaint or information is not sufficient to
charge an offense. Such a plea makes a jury trial unnecessary.
A plea of guilty accepted by the court is a conviction or the
equivalent of a conviction of the highest order .... Each con-
viction of appellee for speeding in violation of a city ordinance
or a statute of the state amounted, under the point system for
dealing with traffic violations, to 3 points and a total of 12
points for the four convictions. Section 39-7,128,R.S. Supp.,
1955. Evidence of the convictions of appellee as recited above
was certified to the Director of Motor Vehicles and when it
came to his attention that appellee had accumulated a total of
12 points within a 2-year period it was the duty of appellant
to revoke the license of appellee to operate a motor vehicle
in the state for a period of 1 year from September 11, 1956,
the date of the last conviction. Section 39-7,129,R.S. Supp.,
1955; Durfee v. Ress, 163 Neb. 768, 81 N.W. 2nd 148.
This was a duty, ministerial in character, required to be per-
formed by appellant. Section 39-796, R.S. Supp., 1955.
It is interesting to note that there is a direct right of appeal in
Nebraska from the administrative order of the Director of Motor
Vehicles." The same is true of the South Carolina Point System where
a direct appeal is allowed to the Circuit Court to review the record of
the administrative determination certified to by the Director of the Motor
Vehicle Division. 6
On the other hand, under the Ohio law, the hearing before the
Court of Common Pleas cannot be considered an appeal. The General
Assembly has imposed a non-judicial duty upon the Court of Common
Pleas. It has provided a procedure whereby the hearing on whether or
not the person with a record of 12 points is an "habitual traffic law
violator" is to be decided by a judge accustomed to conducting hearings
on a wide variety of cases.
A somewhat analogous situation has arisen in the state of Wisconsin.
In the case of State v. Marcus decided on December 4, 1951,17 the
question arose whether the power conferred upon a judge of a court of
record to order the issuance of an occupational driver's license upon
application of a person whose license had been revoked was administra-
15 NEn. REV. STAT. §39-7,130 (Supp. 1955).
16 S. C. CoDE §46-193.12 (Stpp. 1956).
1'259 Wis. 543, 49 NAV. 2d 447 (1951).
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tive or judicial in character."8 The Wisconsin court, citing Cincinnati v.
Wright'9 with approval, stated:
It was there held that the granting, suspension or revocation
of licenses to operate motor vehicles are legislative and execu-
tive functions, and that the power to grant, suspend and revoke
such licenses can be conferred on administrative officers, as
well as on courts, and therefore a motorist who was charged
with violating a municipal ordinance which authorized the
court to suspend his driver's license on conviction was not en-
tided to a jury trial. The Ohio Court of Appeals in its opinion
quoted the following statement appearing in 5 Am. Jur. 593,
sec. 157: "It is competent for the Legislature to prescribe the
conditions under which the privilege of operating an automobile
on the public highways may be exercised." and followed the
same with this statement of its own, 67 N.E. 2d 358 at page
360: "This regulatory power, like all other phases of the
police power, is legislative and administrative, and when prop-
erly exercised presents no occasion for the exercise of the
judicial power." . . . In the case of Ex parte Ballew, 20 Okl.
Cr. 105, 201 P. 525, 527, an Oklahoma statute, 37 O.S. 1941
§83, made it the duty of the "judge of any court of record,"
upon the written request of the county attorney, or upon the
sworn complaint of any other person, to issue a subpoena for
any witnesses that might have knowledge of the violation of
the state prohibition law and to compel such witness to appear
before him and testify as to such knowledge and produce any
books or papers which would aid in the prosecution of such
inquiry. The statute gave the judges the right to punish for
contempt any person who failed to appear in response to the
subpoena or, appearing, refused to answer any proper question.
Such a proceeding was called a "court of inquiry". . . . The
Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals stated in its opinion in
Ex parte Ballew . . . with reference to the duties of a district
judge while conducting a court of inquiry, 201 P. 528':
The duties devolving upon the judge in these special pro-
ceedings are for the most part ministerial, and not judicial.
The Legislature might have delegated this power to the mayor
of the city, to some notary public, or to some other officer.
The fact that this power was delegated to a judge does not
necessarily make him a court of record. Burfenning v. Chicago
St. P.M. & O.R. Co., 163 U.S. 321, 16 S.Ct. 1018, 41
L.Ed. 175; State (Ex rel. Miller) v. Huser, 76 Okl. 130,
184 P. 113 ...
18 WIS. STAT. §85.08(a) and (b) (1957).
19 77 Ohio App. 261, 67 N.E. 2d 358 (1945).
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We are of the opinion that sec. 85.08(25c)(a), Stats.
conferred no judicial power upon the county court of Chippewa
County and that the county judge in entering the order di-
recting the issuance of an occupational license to the applicant
Gerhard was acting solely in an administrative capacity.
It would appear that the nature of the hearing before the Court of
Common Pleas would necessarily be administrative in character. The
record certified by the registrar and additional, competent and material
evidence submitted must assist the court in aiming at the answer to the
question: "Is the person whose license is sought to be suspended an
habitual traffic law violator?" The answer assists the registrar in
carrying out his administrative duties. It would seem, therefore, that
the right to appeal from this rule would be based on the judicial review
set out in the Administrative Procedure Act.2"
Some of the problems that may confront the Courts of Common
Pleas have already arisen under the administration of the point system
established for the District of Columbia. In the first case of Clwppelle
v. Board of Commi.issoners of the District of Columbia,2' decided
January 17, 1955, it was contended that there was lack of proof of
basic facts because police arrest records had been forwarded to the
director. lVithout questioning their admissibility, he took issue with the
conclusiveness attached to them. The court ruled that where an election
had been made to forfeit collateral, not seeing fit to contest the charge,
there was no right to contest them before the director. On the other
charge which was contested in court it was ruled that proof of arrest on
a charge does not constitute proof of guilt of the charge. This situation
should not occur under the Ohio legislation which permits action only
upon abstracts of court records which shall include, among other things,
the nature of the offense, the plea, the judgment, or whether bail for-
feited, and the amount of fine or forfeiture.
The most recent case under the District of Columbia point system
is Ritch v. Director of Vehicles and Traffic decided July 6, 1956.2"
Here, the contentions were that the hearing granted did not satisfy the
requirements of due process because: (1) he was not advised of his right
to counsel; (2) he was denied the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses; and (3) the hearing officer failed to make findings of fact
and conclusions of law.
The court stated that:
Due process, in reference to administrative proceedings, de-
mands that the case be "fairly heard." The requirements of
2 0 0 H0O REv. CODE §119.11 (1953).
21 110 At. 2d 697 (1955). In another case, Lambert v. Board of Commis-
sioners of the District of Columbia, 116 At. 2d 926 (1955), the court again ruled
that election to forego the opportunity to contest the charge bars him from raising
an objection to the number of points assessed against him.
22 124 At. 2d 301 (1956).
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a fair hearing are dependent upon the nature and purpose of
the hearing itself. The procedure followed need not conform
strictly to the formalities of a court action and many adminis-
trative proceedings are purposely conducted in an informal
manner. Informality, unless lacking in "the rudimentary re-
quirements of fair play," or violative of statutory regulation,
does not violate due process.
This concept of informality permeates administrative
action under the point system. The primary purpose of revo-
cation is not punishment of the individual but protection of the
community. It is the result of a determination that the operator
is endangering the lives and property of his fellow citizens. A
motorist is given ample opportunity to correct his bad driving
habits. He is given a warning by mail when he has been
assessed three points. When he has accumulated five points,
he is requested to appear at the Department of Vehicles and
Traffic for a conference. At the conference a review is had
of the motorist's driving record and an attempt is made to
make him more conscious of his obligations and to solicit his
cooperation in observing traffic rules and regulations. The
motorist is warned that should his point total reach eight, his
permission to operate a motor vehicle in the District may be
suspended, and that should he accumulate twelve or more
points, his permit is subject to revocation. The hearing granted
after receipt' of notice of proposed suspension or revocation is
no less informal than the "five point conference." Prior to his
appearance at the hearing, the motorist is advised that the
hearing officer will expect him to furnish reasons why, in view
of his traffic record, his operator's permit should not be sus-
pended or revoked. The hearing officer is not obliged to sustain
the suspension or revocation, but if the hearing develops no
mitigating circumstances such action is usually taken and the
motorist is ordered to turn in his permit within three days.
It is apparent that a hearing of this type does not require
the testimony of adverse witnesses. The motorist is presented
with his own traffic record reflecting the specific violations of
which he has been found guilty or on which he has forfeited
collateral. The purpose of the hearing is not to retry these
violations; it is merely to afford the motorist an opportunity to
show why, notwithstanding the violations, he should be per-
mitted to retain his permit. In the instant case petitioner in his
application for a hearing and for review clearly and cogently
stated why he thought his permit should not be revoked,
namely, that his occupation was that of a truck driver and
without his permit he would be deprived of his means of liveli-
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hood, and he orally stated the same reasons at the hearing.
We cannot rule that he was prejudiced by the failure to be
advised that he was entitled to assistance of counsel.
The court also ruled that in proceedings of this character the
accusatory witness was the petitioner's own traffic record and that under
the point system he is bound by his court record of convictions and
forfeitures. The court also ruled against the third contention, stating
that:
It is apparent that the only findings of fact necessary were that
sufficient points had accumulated to warrant revocation of the
permit, that the evidence offered in mitigation was not deemed
sufficient to justify an exception, and that petitioner was not a
fit person to operate a motor vehicle in the District of Colum-
bia. All these findings are implicit in the order of revocation.
No conclusions of law were necessary.
From these cases it can be deduced that the nature of the hearing
in the Court of Common Pleas will require the registrar to introduce
the certified records, showing an accumulation of twelve points, then
the burden of proceeding with the evidence will shift to the respondent
who will attempt to overcome the prima facie case. Then the court
must consider the sufficiency of the mitigating evidence, if any, produced
at the hearing. If sufficient, it will then be necessary for the registrar
to produce further evidence to sustain the burden of proof.
The question whether an "habitual traffic law violator" is adequately
spelled out in section 4507.40, Revised Code will undoubtedly be raised.
The New York Courts were confronted with a similar situation in the
matter of Ross v. MacDuff decided July 8, 1955.23 Under the New
York Point System a person who, has six points in two years or eight
points in any period of time is considered to evidence persistent or habitual
violation. Two points are assessed for a speeding violation and one point
for passing a red light. The motorist in question admitted to six prior
convictions but offered mitigating circumstances in the hearing before the
Hearing Commissioner. His license was suspended for 15 days pursuant
to statutory authority permitting such suspension "for habitual or per-
sistent violation" of the traffic laws and ordinances.
The contention was then made that this authority was unconstitu-
tional because it delegated legislative functions to an administrative body
without providing any criteria or standards defining the words "habitual"
or "persistent." The court overruled this contention as such a require-
ment should be left to the reasonable discretion of the administrative
official. The court also stated:
The circumstances under which a licensee may be deemed guilty
of habitual and persistent violation vary with the changes in
highway condition, amount of traffic, type of control, power,
23 309 N.Y. 56, 127 N.E. 2d S06 (1955).
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speed of vehicles, changes in local traffic regulations and
ordinances, and a myriad of other elements which necessitate
the delegation of the formulation of specific rules to adminis-
trative officials. (Cf. Matter of Mandel vs Board of Regents,
250 N.Y. 173). It held the suspension justified.
In New York the magistrate or judge has the concurrent power
with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to suspend or revoke in an
individual case. This will, of course, not interfere with the operation
of the point system. The report of conviction must still be forwarded
to the state driver licensing authority. Action thereafter taken on the
record is not a part of the punishment.24 Nevertheless the New York
Courts, under their point system, have gone a long way to protect their
motorists from the therapeutic value originally intended. One of the
defenses raised against the proper assessment of points is that there was
a failure on the part of trial judge or the traffic court to warn against
the possible action which may be taken against their driver's license.
This has been followed with statements that "A license to operate an
automobile is of tremendous value to the individual and may not be
taken away except by due process." 26
Another matter which has arisen is the applicability of the point
system to persons who are non-residents or who do not possess a valid
operator's or chauffeur's license. Inferentially, it may be stated that
Section 4507.39, Revised Code, is broad enough to include them.
However, it would be desirable to clarify this point.
Some question may be raised as to the necessity for forwarding
reports of convictions through abstracts of court records on the ground
that it is not the exercise of a judicial power. It has been held that this
requirement created by legislation is only the performance of a ministerial
duty.2
7
In the final analysis, it would seem that the General Assembly
was attempting to meet the objections which were raised against the
administratively established point system in South Carolina.25 It may have
24 City of Cincinnati v. Wright, 77 Ohio App. 261, 67 N.E. 2d 358 (1945);
Commonwealth v. Burnett, 274 Ky. 231, 118 S.W. 2d 558 (1938); Commonwealth
v. Harris, 278 Ky. 218, 128 S.W. 2d 579 (1939) ; Prichard v. Battle, 178 Va. 455,
17 S.E. 2d 393 (1942).
25 NEw YORK CODE CR. PROC. §335 (a) provides for such a warning by the
traffic court judge. In the matter of Hubbell v. MacDuff, 2 N.Y. 2d 563, 161 N.E.
2d 857 (1957). In the matter of Astman v. Kelly, 2 N.Y. 2d 567, 161 N.E. 2d 860
(1957), decided the same day. See also Tepper v. Kelly, 165 N.Y.S. 2d 802 (1957),
which held that a warning printed on the Uniform Traffic Ticket is sufficient.
26 In the matter of Moore v. MacDuff, 309 N.Y. 35, 127 N.E. 2d 741 (1955).
Also in the matter of Goff v. MacDuff, 207 N.Y. Misc. 624, 139 N.Y.S. 2d 632
(1955).
27 People v. Reiner, 6 Ill. 2d 337, 129 N.E. 2d 159 (1955).
28 South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Harbin, 226 S.C. 585, 86 S.E. 2d 466
(1955).
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anticipated the dissenting opinion filed by Judge Porter Sims on July 8,
1957 in the Kentucky case of Sturgill v. Beard.29 Judge Sims stated that:
In the case before us, the Director instead of carrying out
the legislative will is in effect and in form legislating on his
own accord in inaugurating his "point system," a thing the
Legislature never had in mind when it enacted the various
sections in KRS Chapter 186. Nor is a "point system," or
anything akin to it, mentioned or even suggested in any sections
of Chapter 186. As was written in In re Chapman, 166 U.S.
661, 17 S.Ct. 677, 41 L.Ed. 1154, the Legislature cannot
delegate the exercise of its discretion as to what the law shall
be, but it may delegate to a person or a department the ad-
ministration of the law itself.
I have no quarrel with the "point system" and realize it
is most important to strictly regulate motor traffic and to rid
the highways of habitually reckless drivers or those who con-
tinuously and repeatedly violate traffic laws. But I say such
authority is vested only in the Legislature and in enacting laws
to this end, §2 of our Constitution forbids it from placing
arbitrary and absolute power in one department or in one man.
It is to be hoped that the next General Assembly will enact
its own "point system." Our form of government does not
permit the Department of Public Safety or its Director to
substitute its or his appraisal of the punishment to be inflicted
for a violation of law. Such punishment can only be inflicted
by the General Assembly. No matter how lofty and noble are
the plans of the Director, they must be founded upon a
constitutional basis, rather than upon his own whims or even
his benign judgment or wise discretion.
The legislatively enacted point system will need careful administra-
tion on the part of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles. The Courts of
Common Pleas should meet with the Registrar to outline a modus
operandi that will insure fair play for the violator and at the same time
insure protection of the public from "habitual traffic law violators."
29 303 S.W. 2d 998 (Ky. 1957). The opinion in this case was filed June 21,
1957 the day before the Governor signed Amended House Bill No. 148.
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